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Abstract
For many years, philosopher-of-statistics Deborah Mayo has been advocating the
concept of severe testing as a key part of hypothesis testing. Her recent book, Statisti-
cal Inference as Severe Testing, is a comprehensive exposition of her arguments in the
context of a historical study of many threads of statistical inference, both frequentist
and Bayesian. Her foundational point of view is called error statistics, emphasizing
frequentist evaluation of the errors called Type I and Type II in the Neyman-Pearson
theory of frequentist hypothesis testing. Since the field of elementary particle physics
(also known as high energy physics) has strong traditions in frequentist inference, one
might expect that something like the severity concept was independently developed
in the field. Indeed, I find that, at least operationally (numerically), we high-energy
physicists have long interpreted data in ways that map directly onto severity. Whether
or not we subscribe to Mayo’s philosophical interpretations of severity is a more com-
plicated story that I do not address here.
1 Introduction
In elementary particle physics (also known as high energy physics, HEP), the frequentist
sampling properties of nearly every diagnostic tool are routinely studied. This is rooted in
long tradition, including influential books, as well as in quantum mechanics, which is viewed
by almost everyone in the field as providing the means for obtaining samples of fundamental
physics processes that are perfectly independent and identically distributed (even if viewed
through the imperfect and not identical capabilities of detectors and transducers). Thus,
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frequentist hypothesis tests in the tradition of Neyman and Pearson, as well as post-data p-
values and confidence intervals, are routinely reported. Deborah Mayo’s 2018 monograph [1],
Statistical Inference as Severe Testing (henceforth SIST), is a comprehensive exposition of
her arguments (old and new) in favor of frequentist statistics, with the concept of severity
supplementing the more talked-about frequentist methods. The book also contains detailed
historical studies of many threads of statistical inference, both frequentist and Bayesian.
As a high-energy physicist with long-standing interest in both the history and philosophical
foundations of statistical inference, I found the book to be a fascinating read, even if I did
not linger long enough over some subtle passages in order to fully absorb them. This note
is a belated response to a kind invitation to participate in the discussion of SIST in Ref. [2].
The level of frequentist data analysis in HEP is highly developed, and has been improved
with a lot of input from statisticians of all flavors in the last twenty years. Thus my main
thought in approaching the severity concept was, to be frank, “If it is really useful, we are
probably already doing something equivalent.” I have found that to be the case, with the key
connection being confidence intervals that have an adjustable post-data critical confidence
level, in the same manner that the p-value is a post-data critical value of the significance
level α.
As with SIST, I consider separately the two cases of null hypothesis accepted and null
hypothesis rejected. For the former, the usual practice in HEP of quoting upper limits (at
least implicitly at more than on confidence level) maps directly onto severity concepts. For
the latter, it maps as well, with the modification that we typically perform two-tailed tests
if the point null hypothesis of the initial one-tailed test is rejected.
In order to make this note readable to a broad audience, I have erred on the side of too
much pedagogical introduction, which can largely be skipped over by experts, except to see
the notation defined. In order to keep the length at least somewhat acceptable, I focus on
HEP’s (very) common case of testing a point null hypothesis versus a continuous alternative,
and I emphasize what is typically reported in our publications. In this descriptive approach
of frequentist methods in HEP, I avoid getting very deep into philosophy, and barely mention
Bayesian methods.
2 Background about our field and the HEP prototype
test
In HEP, the frequentist sampling properties of essentially everything we do are studied using
traditional Monte Carlo (MC) simulation methods (less often Markov Chain). We perform
simulations to obtain the distributions of each test statistic under the null and alternative
hypotheses, and to evaluate frequentist coverage of interval estimates (whether obtained by
frequentist or Bayesian-inspired recipes). Asymptotic formulas such as Wilks’s Theorem
and its generalizations are also routinely used, though users are admonished to check by MC
simulation that the asymptotic approximations are valid.
A lot of effort has gone into understanding how best to deal with nuisance parameters,
which are present in all our statistical models, at a minimum to represent residual uncer-
tainties in the calibrations of responses of our instruments. At the LHC, profile likelihood
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functions are a common tool for dealing with nuisance parameters, though Bayesian-style
marginalization (while treating the parameter of interest by frequentist methods) is also
performed. For us, the bottom line is which of these approximate methods gives the best
frequentist performance for parameter(s) of interest, in which situations. In this note, I
suppress reference to nuisance parameters, but one can assume that they are present (and a
nuisance!).
Furthermore, we appreciate well the point emphasized early and often in SIST (pp. 20,
94, 122, and others listed in the index under “auditing”) that the experimental procedure
and the statistical model be scrutinized, and systematic effects in particular identified and
quantified. As I wrote in Ref. [3], “It is certainly worth trying to understand if some physical
parameter in the alternative core physics model is zero (corresponding to the SM), even if it
is necessary to do so through the smoke of imperfect detector descriptions with many unin-
teresting and imperfectly known nuisance parameters. Indeed, much of what distinguishes
the capabilities of experimenters is how well they can do precisely that by determining the
detector response through careful calibration and cross-checks.” Looking back through his-
tory at (in)famous wrong results in HEP, I think that most of them were caused by failure
to specify the measurement model (both the measurement apparatus and the procedure)
correctly. However, in this note, the focus is on idealized situations where the model is
correctly known (and for which there is still plenty of food for thought).
At the discovery frontiers of the field, where one is searching for new elementary particles
and/or new forces of nature, the prototype test (idealized for this discussion) contains a
parameter µ that characterizes the strength of a hypothetical new phenomenon. This can be
the strength of a new force, the production rate of a new particle, or decay rates of known
particles to final states that are forbidden for the known forces. In such cases, µ = 0 means
the absence of the new phenomenon, while µ > 0 means “new physics”. Typically, there is
no firm prediction for a specific value of µ > 0.
It is sometimes useful in this discussion to add the complication that µ is a vector with
two components of fundamental physics interest; one component could be the strength just
described, while the other component could be a particle’s mass, or some other parameter in
the speculative theory, such as a “mixing angle” that represents misalignment of sets of basis
vectors in some Hilbert space of quantum field theory. However, unless explicitly mentioned,
in this note µ is a single (scalar) parameter.
As usual I let x (boldface following SIST) denote observable(s); more generally, x is
any convenient or useful function of the observable(s), i.e., a “statistic” or “test statistic”.
Following usage in HEP as well as in SIST (p. 34, etc.), we let x0 denote a particular
observed value (rather than using the statistician’s notation X and observed x). As with
µ, I sometimes include the case where x is vector with two or more materially different
components. E.g., one component could be an energy and another component could be a
position (or a direction). The “the statistical model”, or simply “the model” is then
p(x|µ), (1)
the probability or probability density (from context) characterizing everything that deter-
mines the probabilities/densities of the observations, from laws of physics to experimental
setup and protocol. (I use the “conditional” vertical line even in a frequentist context where
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there is no distribution in µ, as in Ref. [4], rather than a semi-colon. While disfavored in
SIST (p. 205), I do not find that it ever causes confusion in practice.) This definition of the
model serves our needs, as long as one understands the physicist’s convention that p(x|µ) and
p(y|µ) for some y 6= x are different functions that would more properly be called pX(x|µ)
and pY (y|µ); in HEP the subscript is nearly always suppressed. I do not try to use the model
notation attributed to Fisher (SIST p. 132).
Thus, a large fraction of what we do in HEP can be characterized as testing the “point”
null hypothesis
H0: µ = 0 (2)
versus the continuous alternative
H1: µ > 0. (3)
In this note, I refer to this as the HEP prototype test.
The more general cases where µ < 0, or where the point null is non-zero (as in Sec-
tion 9.1.2), also exist. However, I think that most of the discussion can take place with the
simpler special case. A key point is that frequently the model is only defined for µ ≥ 0. For
example, if µ is the mean of a Poisson distribution, or a particle mass, or a reaction rate,
then p(x|µ) does not exist for µ < 0: one would not know how to write a Monte Carlo sim-
ulation of the experimental setup! On the other hand, there is typically nothing wrong with
x < 0; it is just a sampled value from the model. This has led to a lot of confusion over the
years, when x is unfortunately called the “measured value of µ”. We tried to dispel this in
Ref. [5], not completely successfully. In any case, the situation in which ones observes x < 0
for µ ≥ 0 remains a topic of much discussion [6, 7, 8], with multiple methods employed.
For those who might ask if a zero-width “point” null ever truly exists, I address this
question in Ref. [3]. As has been noted in the statistics literature, all that matters is that
any small width of the set of µ in H0 be much narrower that the width of the likelihood
function (i.e., the resolution of the measurement apparatus). Examples are plentiful in HEP.
The duality between confidence intervals for µ and frequentist hypothesis tests in the
HEP prototype test was implicit in work in our field for many decades, and has been more
explicitly advertised by myself and others for some 20 years. That there is not a duality be-
tween Bayesian credible intervals and the Bayesian treatment of this hypothesis test leads to
the Jeffreys–Lindley paradox [3]. Thus, the HEP prototype test of Eqns. 2–3 is a great forum
for discussion, with controversies both within the frequentist approach and in comparisons
to the usual Bayesian approach.
As this duality is important for my understanding of severity, I belabor my low-level
discussion of it here, essentially repeating how I teach it to HEP audiences [9]. This is
partly to emphasize the choice of ordering that is used to determine which observations x
are extreme, and partly to make a point (Section 6.2) about a missing vocabulary word in
the duality, relevant to severity. Perhaps my somewhat tedious discussion also lessons the
chance for a miscommunication between the language that I use as a physicist and that
which statisticians use.
Another point, discussed in Ref. [3] and mentioned in SIST (p. 212), is that many
published results in HEP (and Ph.D. theses, and successful faculty promotion cases, including
mine) do not reject the null hypothesis! (I am only beginning to try to understand how it is
possible that this seems not always to be true in some other fields that are called “science”.)
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Thus, we have highly developed methods for interpreting such “null results” as quantitative
constraints on speculative “new physics”, i.e., on what can be said about µ > 0 when µ = 0
is not rejected. Since this is also what severity is about, it seems not surprising that we have
concepts corresponding to it.
3 The basic idea of confidence intervals in two
sentences
Given the model p(x|µ) and the observed value x0, we ask: For what values of µ is x0 an
extreme value of x? Then we include in the confidence interval [µL, µU] those values of µ for
which x0 is not extreme.
That’s the concept! To specify the concept in full detail, we need to define “extreme”.
We rank the possible values of x and choose a particular fraction of highest-ranked values of
x that are not considered as extreme. This fraction is of course the confidence level (CL), say
68% or 95%. (I ignore any distinction between confidence coefficient and confidence level.)
We also define α = 1−CL, i.e., the fraction that is the lower-ranked, extreme set of values.
(This description here also corresponds to the construction of graphical confidence belts in
the tradition of Neyman; for a given µ, the set of x values that are not considered extreme
for that µ is the acceptance interval in x. I do not need either expression for this discussion,
however.)
In order to rank the possible values of x applicable to each µ, one needs to choose
an ordering principle. By convention, high rank means not extreme. In SIST, a signed
ordering d(x) is defined on p. 129 as “a measure of accordance or discordance, fit, or misfit,
d(x) between possible answers (hypotheses) and data”. That is fine, but I prefer the more
abstract notion of ordering x values, since depending on the context, discordance may have
a crucial arithmetic sign, or might be mapped monotonically to some other function, etc.,
as in the following examples. I use the notation r(x) (r for rank) for the ordering function.
In approaching a discussion of severity for the HEP prototype test, it is useful to consider
the four different orderings in use in HEP, as follows.
When x and µ are 1D, and when p(x|µ) is such that higher µ implies higher average x,
then we have the three traditional orderings:
Upper limit ordering Order x from largest to smallest: the smallest values of x are the
most extreme (and so have the smallest r(x)). Given x0, the confidence interval that
contains µ for which x0 is not extreme will typically not contain the largest values
of µ. This leads to confidence intervals known in HEP as upper limits on µ, which I
write here as µ < µUL (for values of µ that exist in the model). (I believe that some
statisticians call them upper confidence bounds.)
Lower limit ordering Order x from smallest to largest, so that the largest values of x are
most extreme (and so have the smallest r(x)). This leads to lower limits µLL: µ > µLL.
Central ordering Order x using central quantiles of p(x|µ), with the quantiles shorter in
x (least integrated probability of x) containing higher-ranked x (higher r(x); lower-
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ranked x is added as the central quantile gets longer (contains more integrated prob-
ability of x). This leads to central confidence intervals for µ, a special case of more
general [µL, µU].
For any CL, the endpoints of central confidence intervals with CL are, as is well-known,
the same as upper/lower limits with confidence level given by 1− (1−CL)/2 = (1 + CL)/2.
Both upper limits and central confidence intervals are ubiquitous in HEP. (Lower limits
are typically only implicitly considered via hypothesis testing.) There are however long-
standing controversies surrounding these three traditional orderings in the HEP prototype
test, since the resulting confidence interval can be the empty set (also described by some
as a non-empty interval that is “nonphysical”). Historically, this has resulted in various
alternatives [8] to the traditional upper limit ordering, including a popular “modification” of
the frequentist CL [10] and a Bayesian-inspired approach [11] (Section 39.4.1). Furthermore,
since these orderings are defined only when x is 1D, a more general ordering principle is
needed for multi-D x. In 1998, fellow physicist Gary Feldman and I advocated a unified
ordering based on a likelihood ratio (LR) statistic, which we belatedly learned was the
standard LR test statistic (!), described in “Kendall and Stuart” and successors [4] for some
decades before and since:
Likelihood ratio ordering Order x from high to low values of the likelihood ratio Λ =
L(x|µ)/L(x|µˆ), where µˆ is that value of µ that maximizes L. So r(x) is any monotonic
order-preserving function of Λ.
Of course, as SIST discusses on pp. 133 ff, this ratio was featured in the classic Neyman-
Pearson papers, and has been found to be useful even when the strict criteria of the Neyman-
Pearson Lemma (simple versus simple) are not satisfied.
As noted above, a key aspect of the HEP prototype test is that the model is only defined
for µ ≥ 0. As the maximization of L must respect this, it is usual that µˆ = 0 for various x.
This can change the unified LR ordering materially from all of the first three orderings.
In the HEP prototype test, this LR ordering “unifies” the previously disjoint sets of
upper limits and central confidence intervals into one set of two-sided intervals that are no
longer central, and never the empty set. The lower endpoint of the two-sided interval can
be zero, in which case one can view the upper endpoint as an alternative to the traditional
upper limit. The intervals with LR ordering also resolve another issue where one chooses
between upper limits and central intervals based on the observed data (thus invalidating
frequentist coverage). (SIST mentions a preference for two-sided intervals on page 358, but
in a different context, the so-called two-sided test, where both signs of µ exist in the model.)
In summary, after observing x0 sampled from the model p(x|µ), the confidence interval
[µL, µU] contains those values of µ for which x0 is not “extreme” at the chosen CL, given the
chosen ordering of x. E.g., at 68% CL, [µL, µU] contains those µ for which x0 is in the highest-
ranked (least extreme) 68% values of x for each respective µ, according to probabilities
obtained from the model p(x|µ).
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4 Frequentist hypothesis tests
As in my lectures in HEP [9], we set aside intervals for the moment and consider testing
from first principles, essentially following Neyman and Pearson. For the null hypothesis H0,
we order possible observations x from least extreme to most extreme, using an ordering
principle (which can depend on H1 as well, as in the LR ordering). We choose a cutoff α
(smallish number) called the size or significance level of the test.
We then “reject” H0 if the observed x0 is in the most extreme fraction α of observations
x (generated under H0). By construction:
α = probability (with x generated according to H0) of rejecting H0 when it is true, i.e.,
false discovery claim (Type I error).
To quantity the performance of this test if H1 is true, we further define:
β = probability (with x generated according to H1) of not rejecting (“accepting”) H0 when
it is false, i.e., not claiming a discovery when there is one (Type II error). The power of
the test is defined as 1−β. The power depends on which value of µ in H1 is considered.
In HEP, the tradeoff between α and β is studied a lot (essentially ROC curves) in
intermediate steps of the analysis, for example in algorithms that identify the particle types
discussed in Section 9.1.2. For pre-data characterization and comparison of the performance
of high-level hypothesis-testing algorithms, typically β = 0.5 is used as a benchmark for
evaluating α. I do not recall explicit use of power concepts being used in post-data analysis
of our high-level hypothesis tests. What we use is more closely identified with the severity
concept, as discussed below. (SIST distinguishes severity from various pre-data and post-
data uses of power-related concepts (e.g., p. 343), but I have not studied these concepts.)
5 Nested hypothesis testing: Duality with intervals
As SIST emphasizes, in the frequentist formalism (but not the Bayesian formalism), the
theory of these tests maps to that of confidence intervals! The way that I teach it to students
is as follows. In this section, I do not require that the point null hypothesis be µ0 = 0, but
rather a more general value µ0, so we have H0: µ = µ0.
1. Having observed data x0, suppose the 90% CL confidence interval for µ is [µL, µU].
This contains all values of µ for which the observed x0 is ranked in the least extreme
90% of possible outcomes x according to p(x|µ) and the ordering principle in use.
2. With the same data x0, suppose that we wish to test H0 versus H1 at Type I error
probability α = 10%. We reject H0 if x0 is ranked in the most extreme 10% of x
according to p(x|µ) and the ordering principle in use.
Comparing the two procedures, we see that we reject H0 at α = 10% if and only if µ0 is
outside the 90% CL confidence interval [µL, µU].
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(In this verbal description, I am implicitly assuming that x is continuous and that p(x|µ)
is a pdf that puts zero probability on a point x with measure zero. Thus, I ignore any issues
concerning endpoints of intervals.)
We conclude: Given an ordering: a test of H0 versus H1 at significance level α is
equivalent to asking: Is µ0 outside the confidence interval for µ with CL = 1− α?
As Kendall and Stuart put it, “There is thus no need to derive optimum properties
separately for tests and for intervals; there is a one-to-one correspondence between the
problems as in the dictionary in Table 20.1” [4] (p. 175). The table mentioned maps the
terminology that historically developed separately for intervals and for testing, e.g.,
• α ↔ 1− CL
• Most powerful ↔ Uniformly most accurate
• Equal-tailed tests ↔ central confidence intervals
SIST (pp. 191-193) refers to a similar discussion in Lehmann and Romano’s treatise, with
an example. Statisticians refer to this duality as “inverting a test” to obtain confidence
intervals, and vice versa. Here I refer to the two sides of the duality as the interval picture
and the testing picture. It is perhaps interesting that, while the duality is always there, in
some contexts in HEP we tend to focus almost exclusively on (think in terms of) the interval
picture, and in some other contexts the testing picture.
6 Post-data p-values and Z-values
The above N-P theory is all a pre-data characterization of the hypothesis test. A deep issue
is how to apply it after x0 is known, i.e., post-data.
In N-P theory, α is specified in advance. Suppose after obtaining data, you notice that
with α = 0.05 previously specified, you reject H0, but with α = 0.01 previously specified,
you accept H0. In fact, you determine that with the data set in hand, H0 would be rejected
for α ≥ 0.023.
This interesting value has a name: After data are obtained, the p-value is the smallest
value of α for which H0 would be rejected, had that value been specified in advance. (This is
also discussed on SIST p. 175.)
This is numerically (if not philosophically) the same as the definition used e.g. by Fisher
and often taught: “The p-value is the probability under H0 of obtaining x as extreme or more
extreme than the observed x0.”. I find the first definition to be more helpful in discussing
severity.
In HEP, a p-value is typically converted to a Z-value (unfortunately commonly called
“the significance S” in HEP), which is the equivalent number of Gaussian (normal) standard
deviations. E.g., for a one-tailed test in a search for an excess, p-value = 2.87 × 10−7
corresponds to Z = 5. Note that Gaussianity (normality) of the test statistic is typically
not assumed when the p-value is computed; this conversion to equivalent Gaussian “number
of sigma” is just for perceived ease of communication. This needs to be emphasized when
communicating outside HEP, as I hear too often statisticians wondering about assumptions of
normality, ironically indicating that our conversion is counter-productive in terms of clarity.
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6.1 Interpreting p-values and Z-values
In the example above, it is crucial to realize that that value of α equal to the p-value (0.023 in
the example) was typically not specified in advance. So p-values do not correspond to Type
I error probabilities of experiments reporting them. Thus, the interpretation of p-values is a
long, contentious story.
Whatever they are, p-values are not the probability that H0 is true! This misinterpreta-
tion of p-values is unfortunately so common as to be used as an argument against frequentist
statistics. I ask everyone in HEP to please keep in mind:
• That p-values are calculated assuming that H0 is true, so they can hardly tell you the
probability that H0 is true!
• That the calculation of the “probability that H0 is true” requires prior(s) to invert the
conditional probabilities.
Regarding loose language about the interpretation of p-values, I am at least an associate
member of the “p-value police” (SIST p. 204) in that I think that one should always be very
clear about what p-values are (easy to say, but not so easy to interpret), and what they are
not (also easy to say correctly, so why be loose and risk encouraging confusion?).
6.2 A missing vocabulary word in the statistics literature?!
What seems to be lacking in the statistics literature is a phrase in the confidence interval
picture that is dual to “p-value” in the testing picture! I.e., we need a name for that critical
value of the confidence level for which the point-null hypothesis value µ0 is just on the edge
of the confidence interval or region. For this note, I decided to call it the “p-CL”. Then
clearly, since CL = 1− α, we have
“p-CL” = 1− “p-value”. (4)
For me, as trivial as this definition is, having a name for it makes it easier to think
about severity.
The old concept of confidence distribution is useful as a technical device for reading
off the p-CL. (I have not tried to understand the potential of confidence distributions as
claimed by Singh and others, as mentioned on p. 391.) In 1D, the (post-data) confidence
distribution [12] is the set of all confidence intervals at different CL. (See also SIST p. 195.)
I.e., one can make the post-data graph of the endpoints of the confidence interval as a
function of CL (or provide the equivalent information, as in the likelihood scan in the third
example of Section 9.1.2). Given µ0, one can then simply look at the confidence distribution
to find p-CL, i.e., that CL for which µ0 is an endpoint. (This is purely a technical comment,
quite apart from any philosophical interpretations that confidence distributions may have.)
As Cox noted [12], “In applications it will often be enough to specify the confidence
distribution, by for example a pair of intervals, and this corresponds to the common practice
of quoting say both the 95 per cent and the 99 per cent confidence intervals.” Indeed, we see
papers providing confidence intervals for a couple CL’s in examples from HEP in Section 9.1.
We can have more complicated examples where the confidence interval or region is not simply
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connected (as in Section 9.1.1), due to non-linearities (such as sine functions) in the model.
However, the concept of confidence distribution as a technical device for determining p-CL
is still workable, even if awkward to display.
6.3 Example of p-CL from HEP
Most papers in HEP use conventional values of CL, so that one needs to use the information
given to infer a precise value of p-CL for some µ of particular interest. An exemplary case that
I remember is from early attempts to measure a quantity known as sin 2β, deeply related to
differences between matter and antimatter in the equations of physics. The statistical model
p(x| sin 2β) is only defined for −1 ≤ sin 2β ≤ 1 (but for all x). The bounded parameter space
made this a natural case for the LR ordering of x for obtaining two-sided confidence intervals
in sin 2β. For the CDF collaboration’s first attempt at Fermilab [13], x was a sample from
a normal distribution centered on the unknown true value of sin 2β with σ = 0.42. The
obtained value was x0 = 0.79. As sin 2β = 0 is a special value in the physics equations
(matter–antimatter symmetry), they calculated that value of CL for which 0 was an endpoint
of the confidence interval, and obtained 93% for what I call p-CL. This of course corresponds
to a p-value of 7% in the LR ordering. (Later experiments were much more precise.)
7 Sketch of top-level data analysis procedure in HEP
Finally, my long tutorial-level introduction is over, so we can look at long-standing practice
in HEP in this section, and connect it to the severity concept in Sections 8 and 9.
In a search corresponding to the HEP prototype test, the p-value for the null hypothesis
will typically be reported (often via the corresponding Z-value). In the interval picture, this
is (as in Section 6.2), 1− p-CL for the lower limit for µ (!), though I think that it is rare for
practitioners to think about it that way: for testing the null hypothesis, the testing picture
mentality is typical.
If the p-value is small enough to give some credence to the possibility of a non-zero value
of µ in nature, then generally a central confidence interval is also reported. To statisticians,
this is the so-called effect size in original units [3], much discussed in social science and
medical literature. As described in SIST (p. 211), this can then be used to test a theoretical
prediction, if one exists (as was the case for the Higgs boson).
If the p-value is not small (and sometimes even if it is), upper limit(s) for µ under
the alternative hypothesis H1 are also reported, for some conventional CL(s) (90% in some
subfields of HEP, 95% at the LHC). Many papers also convey enough information so that the
upper limit at other CL’s can be approximately inferred. (As mentioned in Section 3, it is
common to replace the strict frequentist upper limits with one of the alternatives mentioned.
But this does not affect the conceptual connection to severity.)
Thus, when reporting these three results of the analysis, the ordering (ranking) of x
in each is different (in fact opposite for upper and lower limits). Sometimes papers (and
too many internal drafts) will say (paraphrasing) “We have no evidence for a signal [for
µ > 0], and so we calculate an upper limit”. As mentioned above, Ref. [5] criticized such a
procedure, which we dubbed “flip-flopping” (using the observed data to choose the ordering
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for testing/intervals). We advocated the unified LR ordering as mentioned, a single ordering
replacing all three orderings. The LR ordering can of course be consistently used for both
intervals and testing, per the duality, for a variety of CL’s.
It is easy to show that the p-value obtained for testing H0 is the same whether one
uses LR ordering or the traditional ordering. I.e., in the interval picture, given µ0 = 0, the
p-CL for lower limits is the same as that for unified LR intervals. For tests of other µ, the
p-CL’s and upper limits from the two orderings are different. In certain subfields of HEP
(for example neutrino physics), results using the unified LR ordering are routinely included
in reported experimental results, even if the traditional orderings are quoted as well.
From an operational point of view, in the first three traditional orderings of Section 3,
the identification of the null and alternative hypotheses changes from ordering to ordering.
Physicists at the LHC had to understand this in order to write general-purpose software
with a guide how to use it. In the HEP prototype test, for computing the p-value the
software treats µ = 0 as the null hypothesis, as discussed. For computing the upper limit,
the software in effect steps through the various positive values of µ one at a time, and for
each value considers it to be a null hypothesis for a one-sided test in the opposite direction
as that used to test µ = 0.
Thus, I was interested to see that SIST (p. 346) cites Senn as saying what I think is
the same thing: “Senn gives another way to view the severity assessment of δ > δ′, namely
‘adopt [δ = δ′] as a null hypothesis and then turn the significance test machinery on it’ ”.
I did not quite follow why SIST then says that, “the error statistician is loath to advocate
modifying the null hypothesis”, and in the next section, “We are not changing the original
null and alternative hypotheses!”. I think that these may be philosophical statements, but
operationally the calculation (computer code) is as if that change in null hypothesis is being
made.
A related point is the discussion of Hoenig and Heisey (p. 357). The argument seems
to hinge on whether one is “allowed” to switch from lower limits to upper limits. In HEP,
the usual procedure certainly does so. (Lower limits are nearly always considered implicitly
via the dual testing picture, while upper limits are conveyed in the interval picture.)
Whether speaking of two-sided intervals or upper limits, in HEP we tend to talk about
“exclusion” of values of µ that are outside the confidence interval, at the quoted CL, e.g.,
one might say, “Values of µ above µUL are excluded at 95% C.L.”
To prepare a bit more for the comparison to severity, let us focus on the interval picture,
and let r(x) represent one of the four orderings for x described in Section 3. Post-data, after
observing x0 and not rejecting H0, the statement that “µ < µUL at 95% CL” means that for
µ > µUL, x0 is not in the highest-ranked 95% values of x using the ordering corresponding
to upper limits. That is,
0.95 = Pr(r(X) > r(x0);µ = µUL)
≤ Pr(r(X) > r(x0);µ > µUL). (5)
For some µ1 of scientific interest that is not equal to µUL, one can find the its p-CL for this
ordering by finding µ1 (perhaps iteratively) such that,
p-CL = Pr(r(X) > r(x0);µ = µ1). (6)
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If H0 is rejected (and even if not), in HEP one will typically quote, at one or more con-
ventional CL, a two-sided confidence interval [µL, µU] obtained from either central ordering
or LR ordering. This means, for that ordering, that x0 is in the CL top-ranked values of x
for µ in the confidence interval, and that x0 is in lower-ranked values of x for µ outside the
confidence interval:
CL ≥ Pr(r(X) ≤ r(x0);µ ∈ [µL, µU]) and (7)
CL < Pr(r(X) > r(x0);µ /∈ [µL, µU]). (8)
For some µ1 of scientific interest that is not one of the endpoints of a quoted conventional
confidence interval, one can find its p-CL, that value of CL for which µ1 is just on the edge
of the interval, either µ1 = µL or µ1 = µU, with
p-CL = Pr(r(X) > r(x0);µ ∈ [µL, µU]). (9)
8 Severity definitions in SIST for comparison to HEP
As I understand it, the core concept of severity analysis is one that we appreciate well in
HEP. Regardless of whether or not the null hypothesis is rejected, there is additional data-
dependent information to be conveyed regarding the compatibility of any chosen value of µ
(or range of µ) with the observed data. Confidence intervals with CL fixed in advance can
convey some of this information, but confidence intervals with multiple values of CL (in the
extreme, the whole confidence distribution) can convey more. The particular p-CL relevant
to chosen µ of interest conveys this additional information economically.
I think that severity analysis accomplishes the same thing. Severity SEV is approached
from a multitude of angles in SIST, including worked examples. Formally (pp. 143, 347)
there are three arguments (test T, outcome x, claim C), where “claim C” (p. 143) is also
written as “inference H” (p. 347). Typically, the first two arguments are suppressed when
the context is clear.
8.1 The SIST prototype test T+
The prototype test used throughout SIST (e.g., pp. 141, 323, 342, 351) is called T+ and
defined by:
H0: µ ≤ µ0 (10)
versus
H1: µ > µ0. (11)
(Sometimes the focus is on the special case µ0 = 0.) In the statistics literature (including
SIST p. 141), this test is called the “the one-sided test”. To me the HEP prototype test
could be called one-sided, but I follow the statistics nomenclature here.
There are important qualitative differences between the HEP and SIST prototype tests.
In particular, the absence of a point null hypothesis in the latter allows amelioration of
the more disturbing aspects of the Jeffreys-Lindley paradox [14]. This is not so important
for the basic idea of severity, but the differences in H0 do affect the specific considerations
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when H0 is rejected. In the discussion below, when H0 is rejected in the SIST prototype
test, the information to be conveyed via severity analysis is still in the form of a one-sided
inequality. However, when H0 is rejected in the HEP prototype test, scientifically we are
typically interested in conveying information via two-sided intervals (Section 9.1).
In any case, in SIST the usual Neyman-Pearson test is applied (with α pre-defined, thus
implying β as a function of µ), using observed data x0. In the rest of this section, for reference
I include nearly verbatim the key passages of SIST that define severity mathematically and
contain interpretive remarks.
8.2 Severity when H0 is not rejected:
Severity Interpretation of Negative Results (SIN)
This case is described on p. 347 and summarized essentially verbatim on p. 351. Suppose
that the null hypothesis of the SIST prototype test, Eqn. 10, is not rejected in the N-P
test. Then in the severity application, the “inference H” is not just Eqn. 10, but rather the
generalization to µ ≤ µ1 for µ1 > µ0, sometimes written as µ1 = (µ0 + γ), for γ ≥ 0. Then
SEV (test T+, outcome x, inference H) gives “the severity with which µ ≤ µ1 passes test
T+, with data x0”, written as
SEV(T+, d(x0), µ ≤ µ1), (12)
contracted to
SEV(µ ≤ µ1), (13)
and defined by
SEV(µ ≤ µ1) = Pr(d(X) > d(x0);µ ≤ µ1 false)
= Pr(d(X) > d(x0);µ > µ1)
> Pr(d(X) > d(x0);µ = µ1). (14)
The interpretation is:
(a) Low severity: If there is a very low probability that d(x0) would have been larger than
it is, even if µ > µ1, then µ ≤ µ1 passes with low severity: SEV(µ ≤ µ1) is low. I.e.,
your test wasn’t very capable of detecting discrepancy µ1 even if it existed, so when
it’s not detected, it’s poor evidence of its absence.
(b) High severity: If there is a very high probability that d(x0) would have been larger than
it is, were µ > µ1, then µ ≤ µ1 passes the test with high severity: SEV(µ ≤ µ1) is high.
I.e., your test was highly capable of detecting discrepancy µ1 if it existed, so when it’s
not detected, it’s a good indication of its absence.
Another explanation that I also found useful for application to the HEP prototype test
is (p. 343):
Severity analysis: If Pr(d(X) ≥ d(x0);µ1) = high and the result is not significant, then it’s
an indication or evidence that µ ≤ µ1.
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In my rephrasing and notation, that would be:
Severity analysis: If H0 is not rejected, and if the tail probability p(d(X) ≥ d(x0)|µ1) is
high, then µ ≤ µ1 passes the test with high severity (equal to the tail probability). [In
HEP, we would often say that say that “µ > µ1 is excluded at high confidence level.”]
8.3 Severity when H0 is rejected (small p-value):
Severity Interpretation of Rejection (SIR)
Suppose that the null hypothesis of the SIST prototype test, Eqn. 10, is rejected in the N-P
test. This case is described on p. 265 and summarized, with slightly different phrasing, on p.
351. If the significance level α is small, the rejection is indicative of some discrepancy from
H0, and we’re concerned about the magnitude.
The severity concept is evidently applied to the “inference H” (or claim C) that µ > µ1
(pp. 143, 265). While I did not see a general definition of SEV corresponding to Eqn. 14 for
this (SIR) case, from the worked example on p. 143, we can infer:
SEV(µ > µ1) = Pr(d(X) ≤ d(x0);µ > µ1 false)
= Pr(d(X) ≤ d(x0);µ ≤ µ1)
> Pr(d(X) ≤ d(x0);µ = µ1), (15)
which has the given interpretations (p. 265) for high and low severity (noting that 1−SEV <
Pr(d(X) > d(x0);µ = µ1) ):
(i) [Some discrepancy is indicated]: d(x0) is a good indication of µ > µ1 = µ0 + γ if there
is a high probability of observing a less statistically significant difference than d(x0) if
µ = µ0 + γ.
(ii) [I’m not that impressed]: d(x0) is a poor indication of µ > µ1 = µ0 + γ if there is a
high probability of an even more statistically significant difference than d(x0) even if
µ = µ0 + γ.
These are restated on p. 351 for low and high severity (letting d0 = d(x0)):
(a) low: if there is a fairly high probability that d0 would have been larger than it is, even
if µ = µ1, then d0 is not a good indication µ > µ1: SEV(µ > µ1) is low.
(b) high: Here are two ways, choose your preferred:
(b-1) If there is a very high probability that d0 would have been smaller than it is, if
µ ≤ µ1, then when you observe so large a d0, it indicates µ > µ1: SEV(µ > µ1) is
high.
(b-2) If there’s a very low probability that so large a d0 would have resulted, if µ were
no greater than µ1, then d0 indicates µ > µ1: SEV(µ > µ1) is high.
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9 Connection of practice in HEP to severity
In the case where H0 is not rejected, then in the HEP prototype test, it seems that severity
for the claim µ < µ1 is the p-CL for an upper limit equal to µ1 (!). For example, we typically
report µUL at 95% CL. For µ1 = µUL, SEV(µ < µ1) is 95%. For µ1 < µUL, the severity
will be lower, and for µ1 > µUL, the severity will be higher (closer to unity). To get the
exact SEV(µ < µ1) for some desired µ1, one just calculates (or reads off from a confidence
distribution) the CL for which µ1 is the upper limit. This seems evident from comparing HEP
practice in Eqns. 5–6 with severity Eqn. 14. While SIST mentions the possible usefulness
of a connection between confidence distributions and severity on page 195, I think that (at
least from a technical point of view), it is very direct and simple.
In the case where H0 is rejected, the standard severity analysis of Section 8.3 considers
the severity of one-sided claims SEV(µ > µ1). In HEP, once the point null of Eqn. 2 is
rejected, we are nearly always interested in a two-tailed test (or the dual confidence interval)
for µ. The confidence interval can be either that of the traditional central ordering or that
from the unified LR ordering, avoiding the flip-flopping issue of using a different ordering
based on whether or not H0 is rejected. The unified ordering gives two-sided (non-central)
intervals for which the lower endpoint can be used to test µ = 0, while both lower and upper
endpoints can be used to test some µ1 > 0.
The connection of this practice to the severity concept again seems evident from com-
paring comparing HEP practice in Eqns. 7–9 with severity Eqn. 15. The equations are not
identical because the severity equations are one-sided (which defines a sign for d(X) that flips
the inequality), and the HEP equations are a bit more awkward to write. But the concept
appears to be the same: p-CL provides the data-dependent information about the CL that
corresponds to severity. The claim that “µ1 is within the confidence interval at p-CL” passes
the test with severity equal to the p-CL.
For me the situation is thus clear regarding the statements on pp. 192-193 about the
“intimate relationship between severity and confidence limits”, and how “severity will break
out of the fixed (1− α) level...” The post-data p-CL does just that.
Regarding the discussion on page 216-217 about how this gets us to a new philosophy
of inference, at this point I do not see how this maps onto the way we think in HEP. I have
written some thoughts about our philosophy (for example the choice of α, and what effect
sizes are meaningful) in Ref. [3].
9.1 Examples from HEP
For plots of upper limits or the multi-D equivalent in HEP, typically only one CL is chosen;
the rest of the confidence distribution (and thus severity for values of µ1 not exactly at the
upper limit) must be inferred by the reader, as I think experienced readers do. Some authors
do however consider it of interest to plot the upper limit for at least one other value of CL, as
mentioned in the quote by Cox in Section 6.2. I give an example plot from neutrino physics
here, which shows curves for experiments that reject H0 as well as those that do not reject
H0. I also give three examples from Higgs boson physics, in which the null hypothesis is not
µ = 0, but rather the (fairly precise) prediction of the Standard Model (SM) of elementary
particles.
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9.1.1 Severity in a search for sterile neutrinos
The first example is from a search for evidence of a so-called “sterile neutrino”. There
are three known neutrino species in the SM; all interact with other particles via the “weak
force”, one of the four known forces in nature. There is long-standing speculation about
the existence of (at least) a fourth neutrino, called “sterile” because it does not interact
with the known weak force. One way to detect the presence of a sterile neutrino is if one
of the ordinary neutrinos transmutes into another neutrino via the interaction with a sterile
neutrino mediated by a new, even weaker force of nature.
In a simple case, the probability of transmutation can be expressed in terms of two
unknown parameters in the speculative models, namely the difference in mass-squared, ∆m2,
between the sterile neutrino and another neutrino; and an effective angle θ in a quantum-
mechanical Hilbert space. Experiments typically report 2D confidence regions in a plane
conveying the two parameters, usually plotted as ∆m2 versus sin2 2θ. So for this example,
we consider µ to be the two-component vector with these two parameters, and the null
hypothesis of Eqn. 2 means ∆m2 = sin2 2θ = 0. (In fact, both parameters must be non-zero
for the transmutation to take place, but the resulting experimental degeneracy along two
axes is not relevant here.)
Experiments named LSND and MiniBooNE have claimed evidence for such transmuta-
tions, and have hence reported confidence regions that exclude H0. Numerous other exper-
iments have searched for such transmutations and not seen them, i.e., they have reported
observations compatible with H0. The plot I chose as a case study is one from a 2013 paper
by the ICARUS collaboration [15], which obtained results compatible with no transmutation,
but the results were not stringent enough to rule out the evidence from the previous LSND
and MiniBooNE experiments.
In Figure 1, the 2D confidence regions from ICARUS data are to the left of the red
vertical curves, shown for 90% and 99% CL. They are compatible with the null hypothesis,
∆m2 = sin2 2θ = 0. So parameter values to the left of each red curve pass the test with
severity equal to the labeled CL.
The plot also shows the confidence regions from LSND and MiniBooNE, which do not
include the null hypothesis. The MiniBooNE regions are given at more than one CL. The
conclusion from the plot is that ICARUS data was compatible with the null hypothesis,
but it did not have the sensitivity to exclude the parameter values favored by LSND and
MiniBooNE. This was also the case for other experimental curves in the upper left of the
figure, and for additional ICARUS data. I chose an obsolete plot to make the statistics point,
but this subfield of neutrino physics is an exciting area that continues in earnest.
9.1.2 Severity in searches for non-standard couplings of the Higgs boson
After the discovery of a particle dubbed a “Higgs-like boson” in July 2012, a comprehensive
program was undertaken to determine if all of its properties really are compatible with the
Higgs boson of the SM. In less than a year, enough was learned to remove the qualifier
“-like” from public discourse, but a decades-long campaign is still considered crucial for
testing alternative possibilities. This campaign includes measuring, as precisely as possible,
the strength of the interaction of each other particle in the SM with the Higgs boson (which
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can be loosely thought of as the carrier of its own special force). For each elementary particle
in the SM, there is a parameter called a “coupling” that determines the interaction strength
with the Higgs boson. These couplings are predicted with small uncertainty by the SM,
incorporating previous precise measurements of other quantities, in particular the particles’
masses. Any confirmed departure of couplings from the SM values would be an exciting
indication of “new physics”.
The results of numerous analyses of experimental data are summarized by displaying
measurements of interaction strengths (closely related to the couplings) denoted by µ, nor-
malized so that µ = 1 is the SM prediction. As discussed in SIST (p. 211) and in Ref. [3]
(Section 5.4), historically the first thing to establish was that µ > 0 for at least some of the
couplings, i.e., that there was a new boson that coupled to known particles. Then attention
quickly turned away from testing µ = 0, and toward testing the SM value µ = 1 for as many
couplings as possible. Thus, in this subsection, we depart from the HEP prototype test of
Eqns. 2 and 3, and instead perform a two-sided test of the point null hypothesis of the SM,
H0: µ = 1, (16)
versus the continuous alternative
H1: µ 6= 1. (17)
(In speculative physics models beyond the SM, µ < 1 and µ > 1 are possible.)
The three plots shown here are taken from a paper [16] written jointly by the ATLAS
and CMS collaborations, who combined their data samples after first each performing the
measurements separately. (The combination was a huge effort taking over a year, going a
lot deeper that simply computing a weighted average of the separate measurements, and
carefully evaluating the level of correlation in all the nuisance parameters.)
Figure 2 presents the measurements of the interaction strength as measured in the decay
of the Higgs boson to five different decay modes, each to a pair of known particles: two
photons (γγ); two Z bosons (electrically neutral bosons that are carriers of the weak force);
twoW bosons (electrically charged bosons that are carriers of the weak force); two tau leptons
(particles similar to the electron, but with nearly twice the mass of a proton); and two b
quarks (the fifth quark, called “bottom” or “beauty”). The two confidence intervals plotted
for each measurement (obtained via Wilks’s theorem after appropriate cross-checks) are
approximately 68% and 95% CL central intervals, and are part of the confidence distribution
of intervals at all CL.
These measurements from these early data sets were compatible with µ = 1, with
interval lengths that were quite impressive experimental achievements at that moment, so
soon after the discovery. Translating our nearly every-day discussions in HEP into the
language of severity, one could say that µ values within 10-20% of unity typically pass the
test of compatibility with µ = 1 with severity approximately indicated by the given CL
values; a more precise value of the severity can be inferred as desired.
As wonderful as these early results were, it turns out that many speculative new physics
models would alter µ = 1 by only a few per cent or less (especially after being constrained
by existing LHC results). Thus, these data cannot distinguish the SM from much of the
speculation. The confidence intervals will shrink at the LHC over the next ten years and
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more, but there is also a big push for new accelerator(s) to shrink them to be yet smaller,
and hence test the speculative models as stringently as is feasible.
Figure 3 displays the results of the same suite of analyses (including Higgs boson pro-
duction measurements) in a complementary way, motivated by the fact that the SM physics
equations governing the coupling of the force carriers (γ, Z, W, known as vector bosons)
to the Higgs boson are very different from the physics equations governing the couplings
of leptons and quarks (collectively known as fermions) to the Higgs boson. One inserts an
ad-hoc scale factor κV in the couplings to vector bosons in the equations, and a factor κF
in the equations for fermion couplings, and measures those factors. Figure 3 displays 2D
confidence regions in the plane of κF versus κV , for two different CL. Again, these are two
of the confidence regions in a confidence distribution of regions at all CL. And again, the
results are compatible with the null hypothesis of the SM prediction of κF = κV = 1. And
again, the severity of claims regarding alternative values of the factors is evident. It was a
fantastic beginning to the campaign of measuring couplings, but also motivates the effort
(and expense) of obtaining far better precision in the years (decades) to come.
With so many quantities being measured and various ratios of quantities being measured
as well (with the advantage that certain systematic effects can cancel in a ratio), it was
expected that there might be some outliers, if only because of random fluctuations in the
data. These were scrutinized and reported with additional information that I believe also
corresponds to the severity concept. In an interesting case, µ is the ratio of Higgs boson
decays to two b quarks to Higgs boson decays to two Z bosons, denoted as the ratio Bbb/BZZ ,
as usual normalized so that µ = 1 is the SM prediction. The measured µ departed somewhat
from µ = 1. A scan of the profile likelihood ratio Λ as a function of µ was computed and
displayed as −2∆ ln Λ, where ∆ ln Λ is the difference ln Λ(µ)− ln Λ(µˆ). As seen in Fig. 4, the
likelihood ratio scan is asymmetric, with the best-fit value being approximately 2.5σ below
the SM prediction.
One can read off the confidence distribution for µ (p-CL for any CL), and hence the
severity of claims regarding any desired µ1, from Fig. 4 as follows. Since Wilks’s Theorem is
reasonably valid for these data, and as there is just one degree of freedom (µ) remaining after
removing all other parameters via profiling, the quantity plotted has a χ2 distribution with
one degree of freedom. Thus, reading off the curve at any µ and taking the square root gives
the “number of σ” in an equivalent equal-tailed test of a normal distribution, and thus the
p-CL of the dual interval. The horizontal lines intercept the curve at the endpoints of the 1σ
(68%) and 2σ (95%) confidence intervals. The confidence interval with endpoint on the SM
prediction corresponds to about
√
6.3σ = 2.5σ, i.e., p-CL ≈ 99%. One can similarly calculate
p-CL for any desired µ1. Given the “multiple trials” of all the measurements considered (not
yet included in the analysis of p-CL), as well as the high threshold in HEP for claiming “new
physics”, this result was put in the category of something to keep an eye on as more data
were accumulated.
10 Summary and final thoughts
In HEP, regardless of whether or not the null hypothesis is formally rejected according
to some rigid application of N-P testing, there is additional data-dependent information
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to be conveyed regarding the compatibility of any chosen value of µ (or range of µ) with
the observed data. Confidence intervals with CL fixed in advance can convey some of this
information, but confidence intervals with multiple values of CL (in the extreme, the whole
confidence distribution) can convey more. The confidence interval having critical confidence
level p-CL that just barely contains some µ1 of interest is a quantity of interest that can
often be inferred from typical plots in HEP, or computed as scientific interest merits.
The quantity p-CL in the interval picture is dual to the p-value in the testing picture,
just as the CL is dual to α. So this whole note could be written in terms of α and p-value
(testing picture). However, in the interval picture, the connection to severity is more apparent
to me. Aside from different conventions in HEP and SIST about defining H0, and which of
the four orderings to use after the null hypothesis is rejected, the operational methods of
conveying information about compatibility of the data with ranges of µ seem to be the same
in HEP and in SIST.
The underlying philosophy of what we are doing is talked about much less in HEP
and rarely articulated in depth. In my opinion the tensions between different philosophies
are unresolved in HEP, just as they are in the statistics profession, particularly since our
prototype test has a point null hypothesis and a continuous alternative, the situation of the
Jeffrey-Lindley paradox. Thus, I have intentionally kept this note largely descriptive, rather
than prescriptive, regarding practice in HEP.
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Figure 1: Plot of confidence regions in the plane of ∆m2 versus sin2 2θ for sterile neutrino
searches. The ICARUS 2013 results (regions to the left of the red curves), do not reject the
null hypothesis (the origin); the CL labeled on the “exclusion” curves corresponds to the
severity of the claim that the true parameters are to the left of the respective curve. Also
shown are the confidence regions of LSND and MiniBooNE that reject the null hypothesis
(!); the values of CL given in the legend correspond to the interior of the regions outlined by
the various curves, and hence to the severities of the claims that the true values are within
the respective curves. There are also curves from some other less sensitive experiments.
From Ref. [15], which gives references for all curves.
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Figure 2: Point and interval estimates for the Higgs boson coupling strengths from the
combination of ATLAS and CMS data. Also shown are the results from each experiment.
The error bars indicate the 1σ (thick lines) and 2σ (thin lines) confidence intervals. They
can thus be used to obtain the severity of the claims that µ is within each interval, and by
extrapolation, other intervals. Figure 13 of Ref. [16].
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Figure 3: Negative log-likelihood contours at 68% and 95% CL in the (κV , κF ) plane from
the Higgs boson analysis of the combined ATLAS and CMS data sets. Also shown are the
contours obtained for each experiment separately. The CL corresponds to the severity of
the claim that the true values are within the respective region. In HEP, we say that values
outside the regions are “excluded” at the respective CL. There is a long-term program to
shrink the regions for the given CL, i.e., to test severely the claim that the true values lie
within smaller regions. Of course, it would be of great interest to observe regions at very
high CL that do not contain the SM values. Figure 26 (upper) of Ref. [16].
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Figure 4: Observed (solid line) negative log-likelihood scan of the Bbb/BZZ parameter nor-
malized to the corresponding SM prediction. All the other parameters are also varied in the
minimization procedure (profiling). The dashed line is the result expected for data conform-
ing exactly to the SM prediction. The red (green) horizontal line at the −2∆ ln Λ value of 1
(4) indicates the value of the profile likelihood ratio corresponding to a 1σ (2σ) CL interval
for the parameter of interest, assuming the asymptotic χ2 distribution of the test statistic.
The vertical dashed line indicates the SM prediction. Figure 9 of Ref. [16].
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